Republican River Basin
Problems and Solutions Analysis

Written by WaterClaim, November 2005

www.waterclaim.org

The Problem

The Cause of the Problem

Agreement Requirements

Suggested Solutions by Entity

Review of Possible Solutions

The Only Viable Options

The Problem

Nebraska will use more water than the Republican River agreement with Kansas allows. This will result in millions of dollars in damages paid by the State of Nebraska and the probable shut down of a large number of irrigated acres in southwest and south central Nebraska.

The Cause of the Problem

In 1943, Nebraska, Colorado, and Kansas entered into an agreement on how to divide the water in the Republican River Basin. In 1998, Kansas decided that the groundwater irrigation happening in Nebraska and Colorado was causing the streams to have less water and, hence, Kansas was not getting its share of the water. Kansas went to court and was successful in persuading the US Supreme Court that groundwater irrigation should be factored into the formula that determines the supply of water that is divided between the three states. The three states then decided to use a computer simulation (the Model) to determine how much water would have been in the stream if the irrigation well did not exist. The US Supreme Court accepted this method in 2003 and left it up to the states to work out the details of how the Model would work.

While the case was being argued before the Court, the Nebraska Attorney General’s office recommended to the NRDs that they take no action to restrict pumping or restrict development of irrigation. The NRDs wrote letters to the Attorney General’s office, acknowledging the advice and indicating that the NRDs would follow the recommendation of the State.

The negotiations between the three States were conducted on behalf of Nebraska primarily by the Assistant Attorney General and the Department of Natural Resources. The NRDs were informed of what was happening, but they were not allowed to participate. Individual NRD board members were required to sign a statement swearing not to divulge any information about the negotiations.

It is because of the recommendations of the Nebraska Attorney General’s office that many NRD board members feel that the State is responsible for the problem. The NRDs have copies of these letters showing that, at the recommendation of the Attorney General’s office, they did not restrict development or irrigation in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Nebraska lost the lawsuit. The Court ruled that groundwater pumping that affects the stream is part of the formula. The negotiations, beginning in 2003, from which the NRDs were excluded determined the accounting details and the estimates the computer model would use to determine whether each State was in compliance.

Nebraska LB962, which passed in 2004, is often both praised and cursed. The Settlement Agreement with Kansas is largely unaffected by LB962. The only thing LB962 does in regard to the Republican River Basin is to require the NRDs to develop an Integrated Management Plan (IMP) in conjunction with the DNR.

In the fall of 2004 and the spring of 2005, the DNR used high pressure to coerce the NRDs into accepting IMPs of the DNR’s design. The NRDs were assured that, if the IMPs were adopted, compliance with the Kansas requirements would be very likely and that no further reductions would need to be made even in water short years.

It has now become apparent that the Agreement with Kansas will require much larger cuts than what the DNR and the Attorney General’s office realized when they entered the agreement on behalf of Nebraska. WaterClaim has pointed this out in detail since 2004 (http://imperialrepublican.com/c8865.html), but holders of the information (DNR) did not acknowledge the problem until November 2005.

It is often said that the drought is the cause of the problem and that, if the drought had not happened, there would not be a problem with Kansas.

As can be seen from the graphs, allocations and precipitation do not move in tandem. This is because precipitation far from the stream typically does not increase the stream flow until years later. If enough precipitation is received, then run off will occur and the stream will flow more water. However, all of the conservation practices put in place over the last 40 years have significantly reduced the movement of runoff to the stream. The Kansas State University study estimates that, because of windrows, terraces, and minimum tillage, half as much water will reach the stream today from a large rainfall than what would have reached the stream prior to the 1950s.

Average Nebraska Allocation 291,000 acre feet

A full analysis can be found on the WaterClaim web site but, in short, the drought is NOT the cause of the current problem. Instead, the reduced precipitation and the increased pumping will not result in a shortage to Kansas until many years from now. That is the way the computer simulation works. In other words, the problem will not go away when the drought ends and, in fact, the problem will get worse when the full effects of the increased pumping and decreased runoff from ground far from the stream is realized at the stream.

The DNR says that it hopes for a flood. But the accounting rules set up by the DNR with Kansas exclude some floodwaters from acting as a credit. Therefore, not even a flood will solve the problem. An extended wet period could help but too much water all at once is counter productive. Only the DNR can run the computer simulation and predict what will happen. And, to our knowledge, the DNR has never done any such run. We have asked the DNR for all data, but the DNR discourages access by asking for hundreds and thousands of dollars before turning over any public documents.

The DNR is the primary entity responsible for the current problem.

1. The DNR was the lead agency in making the flawed agreement with Kansas. The Agreement is flawed for three reasons:

1. The Agreement will result in the shut down of the majority of irrigation in the Republican River Basin within 50 years. The DNR apparently intended this to be a gradual shut down, but it erred in its estimates. The DNR had anticipated depletions to increase by about 1% a year for at least 50 years. That means that the DNR anticipated a 1% reduction in irrigation each year.

2. The Agreement does not provide enough time for fluctuations in supply and use. When adjusting pumping has almost no immediate effect, then the only way to comply is to supplement supply when needed.

3. The computer simulation does not take into consideration the effect of conservation practices mandated by the Federal Government. According to Kansas State University, conservation practices are responsible for about 70% of all stream flow depletions. Nor does the computer simulation take into consideration the increased water use by trees. The computer simulation assumes no tree growth since 1950. An official State of Colorado study shows that tree growth is a major cause of stream flow depletion, yet the simulation that the DNR agreed to use ignores this fact.

2. The DNR provided false information to the Governor, the Legislature, the NRDs and the public. For example, the effect a well has on the stream was repeatedly misstated. This caused the NRDs to make policies that do not result in solutions. The DNR told key policy makers on the Natural Resources Committee, as recently as August 2005, that no further action on the part of the State was necessary.

3. The DNR told the NRDs, as recently as July 2005, that the reduced allocations, CREP, and EQIP would be sufficient to cause Nebraska to comply with Kansas even in water short years. This was told to the NRDs even though the DNR had computer simulations in February 2005 that showed that a complete shutdown of all wells would not be enough.

4. The DNR has withheld and continues to withhold critical data from all policy makers. The DNR is the sole source for computer simulation information, and they make it very difficult to access this data.

The primary cause of the problem is that the DNR and the Attorney General’s office in 2003, on behalf of Nebraska, agreed to conditions that cannot be met by Nebraska without significant expense and potential destruction of the economy of 20% of Nebraska. This problem has been made worse by the DNR providing incorrect information and withholding information from policy makers and the public.

Agreement Requirements

By the end of 2007, Nebraska must use less water than it is allocated for the five-year period of 2003 through 2007. By the end of 2008, Nebraska must use less water than it is allocated for the 2004 through 2008 period. It is a five-year rolling average within which Nebraska must live. In addition to this requirement, Nebraska must also live within a three-year rolling average, if it is a water short year. Water Short Year status is determined by the water available for irrigation in Harlan County Reservoir each year. During the startup of the process, the first Water Short Year average is for two years. So, Nebraska must also live within its allowed water for 2006 and 2007. If Harlan is still low in 2008, then Nebraska must use less than the 2006, 2007, and 2008 allocation at the end of 2008.

Year	Basin Wide Precipitation % of Normal	Usage Over Allocation (in Acre Feet)	Estimate of water reducing Nebraska’s overuse, if ALL irrigation wells are permanently shut off in 2006
			WaterClaim Estimate, released July 2005	DNR Estimate, released Nov 2005
2003	85%	-25,420
2004	106%	-36,640
2005	100%	-42,000
2006	?	?	19,219	20,000
2007	?	?	34,592	?
Accumulated		-104,060	53,809	?

According to the agreement Nebraska made with Kansas, Nebraska will live within an allocation that is adjusted each year.  Many assume the allocation is directly related to the amount of precipitation received.  That is not true.  Nor is it true that Consumptive Use is related to pumping in the short-term.  Precipitation and Pumping affect the allocation and usage numbers only many years after they happen.  Some people have a hard time believing this is true, but this is how the Model works. One thing to consider when thinking about this is that if rain falls or a well pumps water 10 miles away from the stream, the effect on the stream is not immediate.  According to the Model, ground 10 miles from the stream may not have an effect on the stream for 100 years.  The Model must take into consideration all ground in the Basin, both what is close to and what is far from the stream.  The Model looks at the total picture.  That means that ten different factors, including precipitation and well pumping, since 1918 all get rolled into a number that we have little control over -- yet we are governed by it each year. It also means that it is impossible to adjust the amount of water pumped in any given year to achieve compliance.

As can be seen above, usage exceeded allocation in 2003, 2004, and 2005.  The DNR could use the software to estimate what compliance numbers will be for 2006 and 2007 with a high degree of accuracy because current year pumping and precipitation have little effect on current year compliance.  These types of predictions are what the Model was designed to make.  Currently, the DNR does not choose to make these estimates public.

As can also be seen in the table, even if all 13,000+ irrigation wells were turned off in 2006 and 2007, Nebraska would fail to reduce usage by enough to comply with the Agreement with Kansas. And, of course, if all wells were turned off, the economy of the area and the State would be devastated. The 13,000+ wells pump approximately one million acre feet each year. If you do not pump one million acre feet, the Model gives Nebraska credit of about 19,219 acre feet in the year the wells are turned off. Nebraska earns another credit of 34,592 acre feet if the wells are left off a second year.

The requirement - Nebraska must reduce water usage, as computed by the Model, by 104,000 acre feet plus whatever over or under usage occurs in 2006 and 2007 and do so by the end of 2007.

Publicly Suggested Solutions by Key Entities

DNR – Hope for rain.

Ask Kansas for mercy.

Pump 500 wells directly into the stream

Governor - No suggestions.

UNL - None; The UNL Water Center has not participated.

LRNRD - No suggestions.

MRNRD - No suggestions.

URNRD - Increase irrigated property taxes 60% and use the money to shut down some irrigated acres.

Review of Possible Solutions

Many ideas have been considered. The DNR participated in the first brainstorming session with the Republican NRDs on November 17, 2005. The recommendation from that session was to purchase surface water from Bostwick and then let the DNR figure out how to find the remaining needed water.

Solution	Achieve Compliance by 2007?	Comments
Ignore the problem and let the court resolve the issue	No	Loss of policy control to Federal judge. Large damages owed Kansas. Possible penalties owed Kansas.
Rain	Possible	Uncontrollable and unlikely.
Reduce amount of water pumped by each well	No	Damaging to the economy. Reduces aquifer depletion.
Shutting off wells	No	Destruction of the economy. Reduces aquifer depletion.
Expansion of CREP or EQIP	No	Damaging to the economy. Reduces aquifer depletion.
Pump it Dry	No	Depletes the aquifer.
Tree management	Possible	Increases water in stream. Unacceptable to many landowners.
Remove terraces and discourage minimum tillage	No	Increased flooding. Increased erosion. Unacceptable to most people.
Pump existing wells into the stream	Possible	Depletes aquifer faster. Very inefficient. Expensive. Violates goal of Agreement.
Drill new wells and pump them into the stream	Possible	Depletes aquifer faster. Very inefficient. Expensive. Violates goal of Agreement.
Drill new wells into the Dakota Aquifer and pump into the stream	Possible, but Rejected	Very expensive. High salt content. Pollutes land and water.
Buy water from the surface irrigators and flow it into Kansas	No	The reservoirs are empty; there is insufficient water available.
Drain reservoirs to reduce evaporation	No	Impossible to drain enough. Insufficient savings.
Buy Kansas land and not irrigate it	No	Does not result in compliance.
Renegotiate the Agreement with Kansas	Possible, but unlikely	This would require a new lawsuit on a settled issue. The Supreme Court would have to agree to rehear the case. Kansas would have to forgo something of great value for no gain.
Transfer water from the Platte Basin into the Republican Basin	Possible	Permits continued aquifer use. Requires 2006 legislative action.

Each option is explored below in more detail. Some options are considered in more detail because they are more feasible. Of the 16 possible solutions, six can possibly result in compliance by the end of 2007. But, there are serious problems with most of these possible solutions.

Option 1, Ignore the problem.

Based on damages awarded to Kansas from Colorado on the Arkansas River in 2004, Nebraska will owe Kansas approximately $15,000,000 in damages plus interest, attorney fees and potential penalties. This assumes no further overages in 2006 and 2007. Kansas already has a judgment against Nebraska, so it is now a matter of enforcement.

The first compliance numbers that Kansas can act on will become official sometime in the summer of 2008. At that point, Kansas can return to court on an existing judgment and ask for a River Master to be appointed. By the end of 2008, a US Supreme Court River Master is likely to take control of the water issue from the DNR and NRDs then dictate a solution.

In addition to cash owed Kansas, Nebraska will be required to prohibit the continued use above the allocation permitted. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways, but the most likely is via reduction in allocation by 50-75% for all wells in the Basin or shutdown of about 70% of all irrigated acres within 2.5 miles of the streams and tributaries in the Basin.

If Nebraska fails to reduce its usage or increase the supply by a sufficient amount by the end of 2007, then Nebraska will fail to comply and likely must pay cash damages to Kansas plus lose water policy control to a Federal judge.

Option 2, Rain.

WaterClaim explores the chances of rain solving the problem by the end of 2007 in an article, titled “Can Rain Solve the Problem.” (http://tinyurl.com/8u4no) In summary, it is possible but also beyond the control of man and, hence, very risky to rely on as the solution.

The DNR can provide predictions as to what the allocation and depletions will be for 2006 and 2007 with a fair degree of accuracy because these two critical numbers are largely dependent on precipitation and usage that happened in the past. Because doing nothing and waiting for rain is the most attractive solution, the least expensive, and the easiest politically, many people want to choose it. Therefore, the DNR should issue a report that estimates the probability that rain will solve the problem.

Option 3, 4, and 5, Reduce the amount of water pumped by each well or shut off wells via buyouts.

In February 2005, the DNR quietly released data that showed that, even if every irrigation well is turned off, depletions are not reduced by enough to bring Nebraska in compliance. That means a reduction in allocation from 14.5 inches per acre to 13.5 inches or from unlimited to 11 inches will not have enough of an effect to resolve the problem. This is in spite of the DNR assuring policy makers that such reductions would be sufficient.

CREP and EQIP will take about 7% of the land out of production, beginning in 2006. The amount of land taken out of production may be as much as 10% as more CREP acres are moved from the Platte to the Republican. Turning off 10% of the wells will result in about 2,000 acre feet reduction in depletions in the year 2006, and 2,500 acre feet in 2007. Over 100,000 acre feet in reductions are necessary.

Therefore, CREP, EQIP, and reduced allocations simply hurt the economy, cost the Federal government money, and result in insignificant water savings.

Option 6, Pump it Dry

One of the interesting things about the Model is that, as irrigation wells draw down the aquifer, the stream and the aquifer disconnect from each other. Once the aquifer drops below a certain level, the aquifer stops feeding the stream via springs. The stream is then dry, except when there is runoff from precipitation to feed it. The way the computer simulation treats this is to reduce the virgin water supply and, hence, reduce the amount of water due to Kansas. It also lowers the allocation to Nebraska; but it means that the water pumped from the aquifer is no longer a significant contributor to the water supply.

This means that the faster the aquifer is pumped out, the faster the streams go semi-permanently dry and the less obligation that Nebraska has to Kansas.

This is exactly the opposite result of what most people want. Almost no one wants to dry up the streams. But, the Model does encourage that.

This is a moot point because it would take many years to deplete the aquifer and to dry up the streams, and this is not an option to achieve compliance by the end of 2007.

But, it is important to note that turning off wells that are close to the stream will eventually increase the amount of water in the stream and also the virgin water supply. This would increase the obligation to Kansas, as Kansas has a right to at least 40% of that increase.

Option 7, Tree management.

Tree management is necessary, but it will not result in an adequate increase in supply by the end of 2007. The Settlement Agreement recognizes that trees use water, but it assumes a 1950 measurement of water consumed by trees. In the last 55 years, there has been a large increase in the number of trees in the Basin. In fact, the NRDs have aggressive tree planting programs, though most of these are away from the stream. The dry lakebeds have seen millions of trees grow.

Management of undesired trees would decrease the evapotranspiration of trees and increase the stream flow. Some estimates indicate that the removal of all trees would result in a stream flow increase of over 400,000 acre feet each year. In theory, then, the removal of 50% of the trees would result in a stream flow increase by 200,000 acre feet and be enough to satisfy Kansas. Remember that Kansas already owns 40% of the water, so a 200,000 acre foot increase in flow would result in a 120,000 acre foot credit to Nebraska. It is unclear if Colorado would get credit for 11% of the 200,000 acre feet increase in stream flow. If it does, then Nebraska would only get 98,000 acre feet credit for the removal of 50% of the trees.

Colorado has done detailed studies on costs associated with various methods of managing trees. The least expensive is bulldozer and chainsaw. The more expensive, yet most efficient method is via aerial spraying.

The biggest challenge in managing trees is determining which trees to remove. Most of the trees are on private property and valued by the landowner for aesthetic reasons.

Tree management should be a part of Nebraska’s long-term solution for living within its allocation.

Option 8, Removal of conservation practices.

According to a study (http://tinyurl.com/9fsks) issued by Kansas State University, most of the stream flow reduction that has occurred is the result of conservation practices. The image below is from a report issued by the Republican River Compact Settlement Conservation Committee in July 2005. The initial report indicates that over 1.5 million acres in the Republican River Basin have been terraced. This is more land than is irrigated. It is obvious, from the Kansas State report and from the number of terraced acres, that removal of the terraces could bring Nebraska back into compliance by increasing the stream flow and, hence, the water supply. However, removal of the terraces would also increase erosion and flooding. The terraces cannot be removed without modification of Federal programs that regulate soil management. So, while terraces are one of the primary causes of reduced stream flow, the removal of the terraces is an unacceptable solution.

The fact that conservation programs play such a major role in the reduction in stream flow provides a strong argument to adjust the 1943 Compact Agreement to reflect the major change in how the Basin calculates supply. The Compact permits this renegotiation.

Option 9 and 10, Pump wells into the stream.

Nebraska digs new wells or leases existing wells.  It needs to add 100,000 acre feet to the stream by the end of 2007.  Because 40% of the water pumped from close to the stream is owned by Kansas, Nebraska gets only a 49-60% credit for each acre foot pumped.  It also does not get credit for any seepage between the well and the stream gauge.  Assuming existing wells are used, then the loss between the well and the gauge could be as high as 100%.  If new wells are placed close to the gauge, then there is the real possibility that the surrounding farmers will have their aquifer drained by the new well field. For guessing purposes, assume a new well field has a 40% seepage and evaporation loss.

If the new wells live by the same pumping restrictions and spacing requirements that existing wells live by, then we have to pump approximately 416,000 acre feet of water to compensate for how much Kansas owns and to make up for the seepage loss.  Nebraska can pump less if we eliminate the seepage, but we have to build a pipeline from every well to the gauge. This would be hundreds of miles of pipeline and a massive expense.

There are about 13,000 wells in the Republican River Basin now.  These pump about 900,000 acre feet in an average year.  To comply, Nebraska would need to increase pumping by 50% from normal.

The DNR proposes doing this within 45 days at a cost of $425,000.

Another major problem is identifying the water pumped from these supplemental wells. As the water is commingled with the natural stream, the surface irrigator will attempt to claim the right to use this water for the irrigation of his field. If a Nebraska irrigator uses any of the supplemental water, then Nebraska consumptive use goes up and makes the problem worse. Because the water originates from within the Basin, the surface irrigator has a legitimate claim on the water. His argument will be, “You have sped up the seepage of the aquifer into the stream, and I have a right to access the water because it will not be there in the future.” The surface irrigator may be able to get an injunction to block this out of season consumption of his portion of the water.

This option is worse than doing nothing, as it wastes a lot of money while still accomplishing the same thing as doing nothing. We would explore this option in more detail, if we believed it was practical or affordable.

Option 11, Drill new wells into the Dakota Aquifer.

Beneath the Ogallala aquifer lays the Dakota Aquifer. It has a higher salinity rate. It is possible to drill deep wells and use the Dakota Aquifer in order to increase the water supply. Because Kansas does not have any rights to this water, Nebraska would receive full credit for each acre foot contributed to the stream from the Dakota Aquifer. However, there are several considerations that make this an undesirable solution. 1.) High saline content. Pumping water with a high salt content onto the surface would contaminate both the land and the stream; 2.) The cost of drilling the wells would be significant; and, 3.) The cost of pumping water from a great depth would be cost prohibitive. For these three reasons, drilling into the Dakota is not a practical solution.

Option 12, Buy water from surface irrigators and flow it into Kansas

This is a commonly suggested solution. The water stored in reservoirs is private property and owned by surface irrigators. The water is managed by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corp of Engineers. For Nebraska to receive credit, Nebraska must purchase water that Nebraska surface irrigators have the right to receive. The surface irrigators are dependent on water being available in the reservoir.

In 2004, Nebraska had used 30,800 acre feet of surface water. However, over 20,000 acre feet of that was evaporation from the reservoirs.

The Nebraska side of the Bostwick irrigation district has about 36,000 acre feet of water stored in Harlan County Reservoir that it has the right to use. Nebraska could purchase this water from the irrigators and flow this water down the stream without using it. The Bostwick irrigators appear willing to sell this water to the State.

If Nebraska purchased the 36,000 acre feet, that would reduce the Nebraska overage from 104,000 to 66,000 acre feet. There is almost no other surface water available for purchase. It is also possible that 2006 and 2007 will also show overages for Nebraska. So the purchase of surface water will help but is not by itself a solution.

Option 13, Drain the reservoirs to reduce evaporation.

Removing the dams or breaching the dams would require Congressional authorization. It would also forfeit the flood control and all surface irrigation benefits. This simply isn’t an option.

Option 14, Purchase Kansas land and not irrigate it.

This does not remove the obligation of Nebraska to live within its allocation. Even if Kansas does not use the water (as it is not now), Nebraska still must use less than its allocation or be out of compliance.

Option 15, Renegotiate the Agreement with Kansas.

This is a political decision. It would require the Governor to direct the Attorney General to act. It would also require the Legislature to approve funds to pursue the idea.

Tom Osborne has suggested this as a solution. For this to happen, Nebraska must persuade Kansas to give up everything that it gained by going to court in 1998. Kansas has no incentive to release Nebraska from its obligation and stands to gain at least $20,000,000 in cash plus a reduction in Nebraska water use, which should result in more water being available to Kansas in the future.

Therefore, the only likely way to force a renegotiation of the terms of the Agreement is to return to court. This would require action by the Nebraska Attorney General. It would also require the same people who negotiated the original Agreement to return to the court and argue that they made a bad agreement. It would be difficult to persuade the Court to reopen the case, and it would be difficult for the Nebraska attorneys to admit they made this big of a mistake.

Nebraska would go to Congress and ask the Compact to be reopened. Both the DNR and the Colorado Department of Water have said they oppose this idea.

Nebraska might be able to persuade Colorado to jointly challenge how the Model works. It is in both Colorado’s and Nebraska’s best interest to do so. However, the people who would make the challenge are the same people who crafted the Model. Until the heads of the responsible departments are removed, this is unlikely -- especially since certain key individuals are sympathetic to significant reductions in irrigation.

While the idea is attractive, it requires politicians with considerable courage and determination. At present, it is unlikely that Nebraska will challenge the Agreement and, if it does, it is unlikely to be successful.

Option 16, Transfer water from the Platte Basin to the Republican Basin.

Emergency Spring Creek Plan. – In November of 2004, WaterClaim identified this as being the most feasible and the least costly option. This proposal was distributed to the Upper, Middle and Lower Republican NRD board members, the DNR, the Attorney General’s office, and to Senator Schrock, chair of the Natural Resources Committee. Responsibility for the idea was given to the Nebraska Republican River Management Districts Association, which voted to consider the idea. Roger Patterson with the DNR also promised to take action on the plan.

WaterClaim proposed transferring 25,000 acre feet each year from the Platte to the Republican. The cost for this would be less than the CREP program currently being implemented. The current shortage would require 50,000 acre feet to be transferred in both 2006 and 2007 to insure compliance. The plan could easily be modified to move more water, if any of the policy makers decided it was worth considering.

The transfer keeps the cash in Nebraska. It requires less cash than what will be paid to Kansas in damages. Also, of all options, it also keeps the most land in production while complying with the Kansas Agreement.

The Settlement Agreement with Kansas permits the importation of water into the Basin. The Agreement gives a one-for-one credit. For every acre foot imported, Nebraska gets one acre foot of credit. None of this water is owed to Kansas or Colorado. The water is moved directly into the Republican River just above Harlan County Reservoir via a natural waterway. Nebraska does not owe this water to Kansas, nor does Kansas have any right to this water. But, because Nebraska imported it into the Basin, Nebraska reduces its Consumptive Use as long as Nebraska does not use it consumptively.

A full detail of the plan can be found at Spring Creek Plan on the WaterClaim web site. (www.waterclaim.org)

The plan is easy to implement. The transfer point requires the installation of one gate in a canal. Cost is less than $20,000. Erosion control for the increased flow in an existing waterway would be required. The waterway does not disrupt any existing farmland. The full plan is more detailed; but, in short, for this plan to work, the following has to happen:

a. The 2006 Legislature authorizes someone to oversee the project, approves the transfer, and authorizes funding.

b. The DNR is directed to provide 2006 and 2007 water need estimates.

c. A deal is negotiated with CNPPID, permitting the use of its canals.

d. Landowners in the Platte are contacted and their water is leased at above-market rates.

e. Businesses affected by the reduction in irrigated acres are compensated.

f. Sufficient water is transferred in 2006 and 2007 to bring Nebraska into compliance by the end of 2007.

Post 2007 transfers are smaller and jointly managed by the NRDs and State. Unlike CREP, where the retired irrigated acres are completely taken out of production, this proposal will permit the leased land to continue to be farmed dry.

The cost for doing this is less than the cost of paying Kansas. It keeps the money in Nebraska. It keeps the most land in production of any of the options. It keeps the economy of the region viable. Plus, it honors the Agreement with Kansas.

Don Stenberg, the Attorney General in office at the early stages of the negotiations, points out that the Settlement specifically permits this type of transfer and that it is the only economical solution available to the State.

So, if this solution is easy to do, solves the problem, and is the least expensive option, why hasn’t it happened?

Roger Patterson with the DNR publicly supported the idea and said it would work. He spoke to each Republican River NRD board manager in the presence of WaterClaim and encouraged them to pursue the idea. However, Roger Patterson said, “Because the DNR is the regulator and would have to authorize the idea, the DNR could not also be the advocate. Therefore, it is up to the NRDs to take the lead.” The DNR made these statements in November 2004 and again in January and February 2005.

WaterClaim took the proposal to each NRD board and presented it at the individual Board meetings. The Upper Republican NRD voted to ask the Republican River Management Association to consider the idea. The Middle Republican directed management to cooperate with any review. The manager of the Middle Republican NRD is also the Chairman of the Republican River Management Association. The Lower Republican voted to consider the idea.

The Republican River Management Association also includes the four surface irrigation districts. In February 2005, the Association voted to consider the transfer idea and any other ideas that might help. WaterClaim then trusted the Association to take the idea and give it fair consideration.